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Do Criminal Judges Discriminate?
by Fabien JOBARD
Because of the absence of statistics known as “ethnic” in France,  social 
scientists do not have at their disposal data on possible discriminations produced 
by  criminal  law  judges.   To  compensate  for  this  dearth,  Fabien  Jobard, 
researcher at  the French National  Centre of  Scientific  Research (CNRS),  has 
examined decisions handed down by a court in the Paris area with respect to acts 
of insulting conduct, rebellion and violence against agents of the public authority. 
His study helps to place in much clearer perspective the commonplace by which 
judges are indifferent to skin colour in their judgments. 
Little is known in France about possible acts of discrimination produced by 
judicial  decisions.   In  Anglo-Saxon  countries,  “race  and  sentencing”  studies  are 
superabundant.  In these countries, researchers have at their disposal pre-formatted 
statistical  data  by  the  records  of  ethnic  characteristics  the  persons  judged  or  the 
victims declare voluntarily.  The ability to access ethnic statistics simplifies the work 
of objectifying discriminatory acts.  This is not possible in France, where the task 
consisting  of  determining  whether  there  is  discrimination  in  judgments  rendered 
requires the researcher to generate the statistics himself.  
It is to this task that Sophie Névanen and I have addressed ourselves1.  We have 
assembled  the  judgments  delivered  by  the  District  Court  of  Melun  (Tribunal  de 
1 Fabien Jobard and Sophie Névanen, “La couleur du jugement. Discriminations dans les décisions 
judiciaires en matière d’infractions à agents de la force publique (1965 – 2005)”, Revue Française 
de Sociologie, Vol. 48,  2007/2, pp. 243 – 272.
grande instance de Melun) from 1965 to 2005, concerning ourselves with a sole type 
of offence: offences against persons invested with the public authority (referred to as 
IPDAP), whether they are acts of insulting conduct, rebellion, insult and rebellion, 
violence  (and  combinations  of  these  offences).   The  data  on  IPDAP cases  tried, 
without including the offences, make it possible to develop a clearly defined set of 
qualifications, which is relatively unpolluted by legislative evolutions, as can be the 
cases  for  offences  of  violence  or  robbery,  complicated  by  diverse  aggravating 
circumstances over the succession of laws that compromise their historical legibility.
We have thus assembled a set of 864 defendants tried in a criminal court in an 
outlying Parisian suburb, which we characterized according to their origin and the 
consonance of their names, forming three groups (modelled on the classification used 
by  the  Criminal  Investigation  Department):  the  “European”  group,  the  “North 
African”  group  and  the  “Black”  group.   A defendant  born  in  France,  bearing  a 
typically  African  family  name  or  first  name,  belongs  to  the  African  group;  a 
defendant born in the Maghreb belongs to the “North African” group (except if he 
bears a French Catholic  name, in which case he is considered to be a  pied-noir - a 
French  national  born  in  colonial  North  Africa  and  therefore  belonging  to  the 
“European group”); a defendant born in France and bearing an Arab or Berber name 
belongs to the “North African” group, etc.  This classification is rudimentary because 
it neither allows the characterization of Black defendants with an Arab name, nor of 
the  Black  defendant  born  in  continental  France  and  bearing  a  typically  French 
Catholic family and first name (such as the football player Thierry Henry).  
Notwithstanding  all  this,  during  the  period  under  consideration,  62%  of 
defendants  tried  for  a  separate  IPDAP  offence  refer,  over  the  period  under 
consideration, to the “European” group, 20% to the “North African” group, 15% to 
the “Black” group (and 2.2% to other  groups).   First  discovery:  these groups are 
undeniably unequal in regard to sentencing.  Firm prison sentences were delivered 
against 13.6% in the “European” group, but against 23.6% in the “North African” and 
25.4% in the “Black” groups.  To put it differently, the risk of firm imprisonment is 
nearly twice as high for defendants from the “North African” and “Black” groups as 
for those from the “European” group.  However, these groups may be different from 
one another, and composed differently: it is necessary to examine the “composition 
effects” or the “structural effects” (please see statistical box below), because if we end 
our analysis with groups constructed in this manner, making a single sorting, we risk 
concealing a great deal and saying too little.  
Glossary
*Structural effect: When a population is divided into subpopulations, it may 
occur  that  a  characteristic  evolves  in  one  direction  in  each  subpopulation,  while 
evolving in the opposite direction for the whole population.  This paradox can be 
explained because the sizes of certain subpopulations increase while others diminish: 
that is the structural effect.
For example, the salary of each profession may stagnate (or increase slightly) 
while  the  average  salary  increases  strongly;  this  occurs  if  the  highly  qualified 
professions  (the  best  paid)  become  more  and  more  numerous,  and  vice  versa, 
unskilled employment (the least paid) becomes more rare.  A contrario, the variation, 
holding structure constant, is calculated as a weighted average of average variations, 
the weights being the size of each subpopulation.  (Source: INSEE, Nomenclature). 
*  Multivariate  Analysis:  statistical  analysis  of  relations  that  may  exist 
between several (response) variables.
Thus, it is necessary to first distinguish the separate offences that belong to the 
class  of  offences  against  persons  invested  with  the  public  authority  (IPDAP). 
Sentences stipulated for violence are greater that those for rebellion, etc.  In our court, 
the risk of firm imprisonment that was observed is 1 out of 10 for simple insulting 
conduct, 1 out of 5 for rebellion or for insulting conduct + rebellion, and 1 out 3 for 
violence.  Now, the accused individuals in the “European” group are more frequently 
arraigned for offensive conduct and less frequently for violence (and inversely for the 
other groups).  Also, the defendants in the “European” group are more frequently 
present  at  the  hearing  than  other  groups;  and  this  type  of  judgment,  known  as 
“contradictory”, is always more favourable to the defendants.  Finally, it is among the 
groups of “Blacks” and “North Africans” that are found the highest proportion of 
defendants  being  judged  as  repeat  offenders  (most  often  brought  to  court  for 
immediate trial): an accused individual who is judged in immediate trial incurs nearly 
one chance out of two of being sentenced to firm imprisonment.  
The impact of these structural and compositional effects increases when one 
combines all these variables to determine the sentence handed down, all else held 
constant, by means of a multiple regression, and it becomes clear that the “group” 
variable does not have, in itself, any influence.  In reality, this variable contains the 
other variables; it is only a reflection of the other variables, which in fact are the ones 
that  determine  the  decision  of  the  judge.   Thus,  in  spite  of  appearances  that  are 
nevertheless  spectacular,  judges  are indifferent  to the colour  of the skin or to  the 
origin of the defendants.
On the other hand, the situation is different in regards to policemen.  Since they 
are victims, they have the possibility of becoming plaintiffs in the proceedings and to 
sue for damages in compensation for the moral harm suffered.  Now, 37% of accused 
individuals in the “European” group face police officers who exercise their right to 
appear in court as a plaintiff, as opposed to 51% of defendants in the “North African” 
group and 46% in the group of “Blacks”.  And in this case, the multivariate analysis 
shows,  all  else  remaining  equal,  that  the  “group”  variable  does  in  fact  have  an 
influence of its own (second statistical box below).  While the decisions of the judges 
seem to be impervious to the physical appearance of defendants, personal decisions of 
the policemen - subject to further study over a larger sample - are not.
What should be the conclusion?  First, that it is necessary to be prudent with 
statistics.  A scientific answer to a political question (“Is there discrimination?”) is 
fairly complicated: it  does not suffice to discern a statistical discrepancy, however 
large it may be:  it is necessary to study its composition and its structure.  Moreover, 
the  statistics  record  persons  who  have  already  been  selected  – by  the  public 
prosecutor’s office, by the criminal investigation officer and by the policeman who 
decided the arrest.   Consequently, our study does not make it possible to say that 
“Blacks” or  “North  Africans” commit  the  worst  offences  against  policemen more 
often than others.  It is necessary to say that “North Africans” and “Blacks” are more 
frequently judged for more serious charges.  Finally, this study provides us with a 
major lesson on the more general mechanism of judicial discrimination.  Judges are 
blind to differences.  In the process, nevertheless they aggravate them.  This paradox 
is the result of their position as the last link in a penal chain that has produced their 
decisions upstream.  
Judges  know  that  they  can  decently  reserve  imprisonment  solely  for  their 
clientele: those who have already been in prison.  A defendant who has already been 
sentenced  runs  a  great  risk  of  being  sentenced  again.   Furthermore,  a  “socially 
integrated” defendant (having a permanent work contract, a stable family situation, 
etc.) will received clemency from the judge, who knows that prison would condemn 
the accused as much on the social as on the criminal plane.  (This realism in the 
profession places the failure of the penitentiary’s mission on display every day.)  This 
is what our study thrusts into the spotlight: “Blacks” and “North Africans” make up 
the greater part of the criminal clientele, that such a particular population, the main 
part of whose socialization is, very rapidly, assumed by the judicial system.
Logistic Regression (variable to be explained: Firm Imprisonment)
Base CI Odds Ratio 95% CI Number
Situation of Free        1 N=651
defendant Other     1.98 [0.56-6.94] N=19
Detained     9.64 [1.09-85.12] N=8
Trial mode Not in immediate trial        1 N=572
Immediate trial        6.95 [2.59-18.69] N=106
Judgment type Contradictory         1 N=436
Default, repetitive default     6.46 [2.93-14.25] N=74
Contradictory to be signified     7.37 [3.84-14.17] N=168
Type of Offense Insulting conduct      1 N=360
Rebellion     1.03 [0.45-2.35] N=64
Insult and rebellion     1.44 [0.80-2.60] N=155
Violence     3.88 [1.73-8.69] N=99
Only significant variables appear in the table.  The significant odds ratios are in bold print.
Translated from french by Ken Ritter. 
Further reading : 
- about relations jeunes/police.
- about sévérité des juges en matière d’IPDAP
- about relation de la police au savoir.
- The site of CESDIP  
Article published on laviedesidees.fr, 2008, July 24th.
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Logistic Regression (variable to be explained: Policeman Plaintiff)
Base PC Odds Ratio 95% CI Number
Meta-groups European        1 N=549
Other groups     1.39 [1.03-1.86] N=334
Type of Offense Insulting conduct      1 N=409
Rebellion     1.13 [0.72-1.78] N=103
Insult and rebellion     1.62 [1.13-2.32] N=184
Violence     1.77 [1.14-2.75] N=127
Trial mode Not in immediate trial        1 N=666
Immediate trial     1.80 [1.22-2.65] N=157
Only significant variables appear in the table.  The significant odds ratios are in bold print.
